Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005

Volume II: Appendices

by


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This report contains the observations and findings of an investigation by an independent team of professional engineers and researchers with a wide array of expertise. The materials contained herein are the observations and professional opinions of these individuals, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or endorsement of any other group or agency.

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This report is dedicated to the people of the greater New Orleans region; to those that perished, to those that lost friends and loved ones, and to those that lost their homes, their businesses, their place of work, and their community.

New Orleans has now been flooded by hurricanes six times over the past century; in 1915, 1940, 1947, 1965, 1969 and 2005.

It must be our goal that it not be allowed to happen again.
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